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Abstract
We introduce a logic for temporal beliefs and
intentions based on Shoham’s database perspec-
tive. We separate strong beliefs from weak be-
liefs. Strong beliefs are independent from inten-
tions, while weak beliefs are obtained by adding
intentions to strong beliefs and everything that fol-
lows from that. We formalize coherence conditions
on strong beliefs and intentions. We provide AGM-
style postulates for the revision of strong beliefs
and intentions. We show in a representation the-
orem that a revision operator satisfying our postu-
lates can be represented by a pre-order on interpre-
tations of the beliefs, together with a selection func-
tion for the intentions.
1 Introduction
Recently there has been an increase in articles studying the
dynamics of intentions in logic [Ditmarsch et al., 2011;
Icard et al., 2010; Lorini and Herzig, 2008;
van der Hoek et al., 2007; Lorini et al., 2009;
Grant et al., 2010]. Most of those papers take as a starting
point the logical frameworks derived from Cohen and
Levesque [1991], which in turn formalize Bratman’s [1987]
planning theory of intention. In this paper, we take a
different starting point, and study the revision of intentions
from a database perspective [Shoham, 2009]. The database
perspective consists of a planner, a belief database and an
intention database. Shoham [2016] describes it as “(...)
a generalization of the AGM scheme for belief revision,
(...). In the AGM framework, the intelligent database is
responsible for storing the planner’s beliefs and ensuring
their consistency. In the enriched framework, there are two
databases, one for beliefs and one for intentions, which
are responsible for maintaining not only their individual
consistency but also their mutual consistency.” (p.48)
Shoham further developed these ideas with Jacob Banks,
one of his PhD students, and behavioral economist Dan
Ariely in the intelligent calendar application Timeful, which
attracted over $6.8 million in funding and was acquired by
Google in 20151, who aim to integrate it into their Calendar
applications. As Shoham [2016] says himself: “The point
of the story is there is a direct link between the original
journal paper and the ultimate success of the company.”
(p.47) Thus, it seems clear that his philosophical proposal
has lead to some success on the practical side. In this paper,
we investigate whether his proposal can lead to interesting
theoretical insights as well. More specifically, the aim of this
paper is to develop a suitable formal theory for the belief
and intention database in the database perspective, and to
study belief and intention revision for this theory. Following
Shoham’s proposal, our methodology is to generalize AGM
revision [Alchourron et al., 1985] for temporal beliefs and
intentions in terms of a representation theorem.
In the area of intention revision and reconsidera-
tion, Grant et al. [2010] combine intention revision with
AGM-like postulates. There have also been a num-
ber of contributions applying AGM-style revision to ac-
tion logics [Shapiro et al., 2011; Jin and Thielscher, 2004;
Scherl, 2005; Scherl and Levesque, 2003; Bonanno, 2007].
However, these proposals only characterize revision us-
ing a set of postulates, without proving representation
theorems. There are also approaches that focus on
the semantical level by postulating revision on a Kripke
model [Baral and Zhang, 2005]. Both Icard et al. [2010] and
van Zee et al. [2015b] develop a logic based on Shoham’s
database perspective and prove representation theorems, but
we will analyze the shortcomings of their proposals in the
next section.
The three main technical results of this paper are
as follows: First we review two recent formalisations
based on Shoham’s database perspective, namely the
IPS framework [Icard et al., 2010] and the PAL frame-
work [van Zee et al., 2015a], and we discuss the shortcom-
ings of these logics. Secondly, we extend PAL in order to
define a coherence condition on strong beliefs and inten-
tions, and we separate strong, or intention-independent, be-
liefs from weak beliefs. Lastly, we characterize revision of
beliefs and intentions through AGM-style postulates and we
prove a representation theorem relating the postulates for re-
vision to an ordering among interpretations and a selection
1http://venturebeat.com/2015/05/04/google-acquires-
scheduling-app-timeful-and-plans-to-integrate-it-into-google-apps/
function that accommodates new intentions while restoring
coherence. The three next sections of the paper are in line
with these three results.
2 Preliminaries: The Database Perspective
We review Shoham’s database perspective, and we discuss
the main limitations of two recent formalizations. For the
first formalization (IPS), the separation between strong and
weak beliefs is problematic, and the representation theorem
only holds for a specific type of beliefs. For the second for-
malization (PAL), intention revision is missing.
2.1 Shoham’s Database Perspective
Shoham’s database perspective contains a planner (e.g., a
STRIPS-like planner) that is itself engaged in some form of
practical reasoning. In the course of planning, it may add ac-
tions to be taken at various times in the future to an intention
database and add observations to a belief database. The inten-
tions are future-directed intentions of the form (a, t), meaning
that action a will be executed at time t.2 The beliefs are also
time-indexed, and are of the form pt , meaning that p is true
at time t. Shoham treats the planner as a “black box”: It pro-
vides the databases with input but its internal workings are
unknown. Shoham proposes informal revision procedures for
beliefs and intentions based on the following coherence con-
ditions:
1. If two intended actions immediately follow one another,
the earlier cannot have postconditions that are inconsis-
tent with the preconditions of the latter.
2. If you intend to take an action you cannot believe that its
preconditions do not hold.
3. If you intend to take an action, you believe that its post-
conditions hold.
Note that requirement 2 and 3 describe an asymmetry be-
tween pre-and postconditions: The postconditions are be-
lieved to be true after an intended action, but the precondi-
tions may not. Therefore, we might think of the requirements
as one of “optimistic” beliefs. According to Shoham [2009]:
“It is a good fit with how planners operate. Adopting an op-
timistic stance, they feel free to add intended actions so long
as they are consistent with current beliefs.” (p.7)
2.2 Icard et al. (IPS)
Icard et al. [2010] develop a “formal semantical model to
capture action, belief and intention, based on the ‘database
perspective”’ (p.1). They assume a set of atomic sen-
tences Prop = {p,q,r, . . .} and deterministic primitive actions
Act={a,b,c, . . .}. Entries in the belief database are repre-
sented by a language generated from:
ϕ := pt | pre(a)t | post(a)t | Do(a)t |ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
with p ∈ Prop,a ∈ Act, and t ∈ Z. pt means that p is true at
time t, Do(a)t means that the agent does action a at time t, and
2The notion of intention here is clearly quite restrictive and im-
portant characteristics of intentions are missing. See the conclusion
for a discussion.
pre(a)t and post(a)t represent respectively the precondition
and postcondition of action a at time t.
Icard et al. use a semantics of appropriate paths. They
define P= P (Prop∪{pre(a), post(a) : a ∈ Act}), and a path
pi : Z→ (P×Act) as a mapping from a time point to a set of
proposition-like formulas true at that time (denoted pi(t)1) and
the next action a on the path (denoted pi(t)2). They define
an equivalence relation pi ∼t pi′, which means that pi and pi′
represent the same situation up to t. Using this, they propose
a notion of appropriateness:
Definition 1 (Appropriate Set of Paths). A set of paths Π is
appropriate iff for all pi ∈Π:
• If pi(t)2 = a, then post(a) ∈ pi(t + 1)1,
• If pre(a)∈ pi(t)1, then there exists pi′∼t pi s.t. pi′(t)2 = a.
The truth definition |=Π is defined relative to an appropriate
set of paths Π, and the modality is defined as follows:
pi, t |=Π ϕ, iff for all pi′ ∈Π, if pi∼t pi′ then pi′, t |= ϕ.
A model for a formula is an appropriate set of paths. They
introduce an intention database I = {(a, t), . . .} as a set of
action-time pairs (a, t) and put the following coherence con-
dition on their logic:
Cohere∗(I) = ♦
∧
(a,t)∈I
pre(a)t .
This captures the intuition that an agent considers it possible
to carry out all intended actions. They state that a set of mod-
els is coherent if and only if there exists a model in which
Cohere∗(I) is true. IPS distinguishes intention-contingent, or
weak, beliefs from non-contingent, or strong, beliefs. Contin-
gent beliefs BI are obtained from a belief-intention database
(B, I) as follows: BI = Cl(B∪ {Do(a)t : (a, t) ∈ I}). In or-
der to switch from belief bases to an appropriate set of paths,
Icard et al. introduce the functions ρ and β: “Given a set of
formulas B, we can consider the set of paths on which all for-
mulas of B hold at time 0, denoted ρ(B). Conversely, given a
set of paths Π, we let β(Π) be defined as the set of formulas
valid at 0 in all paths in Π.” (p.3)
The first issue with IPS is that the definition of non-
contingent beliefs is problematic for coherence. The follow-
ing example shows that non-contingent beliefs that are de-
pendent on the actual path can lead to a coherent agent with
inconsistent weak beliefs.
Example 1. Consider an IPS belief-intention base (B, I) with
the belief base B = {p1,¬♦(do(a)2∧ p1)} and intention base
I = {(a,2)}. While B is consistent with ♦pre(a)2, BI is in-
consistent since ¬♦(do(a)2 ∧ p1)∧ do(a)2 derives ¬p1, but
this is inconsistent with the initial belief p1.
In Section 3 we will define our notion of coherence that
together with a separation between strong and weak beliefs
resolves this problem.
The second issue with IPS is that the definition of ρ is cir-
cular, and as a result it does not seem to be possible for all
formulas of their logic. Consider the following example.
Example 2. Suppose B = {p1∨¬p1}. The set of paths
ρ(B) contains all paths pi for which pi |= B, i.e. pi |= p1 ∨
¬p1. Take such a path pi arbitrary, so either pi |= p1 or
pi |= ¬p1. Suppose pi |= p1. Then it follows that for all
pi′ ∼t pi we have pi′ |= p1. On the other hand, if pi |= ¬p1,
then it follows that for all pi′ ∼t pi we have pi′ |= ¬p1. So in
both cases we end up with two different sets for ρ(B). In other
words, the set of paths ρ(B) is not defined.
Essentially, according to IPS, ρ(B) = {pi | pi |=Π B}. The
set of appropriate paths for a belief base B is thus constructed
using |=Π. However, |=Π is aleady defined relatively to some
set of paths Π. Therefore, the definition of ρ is circular. It
seems that the ρ function only works for belief bases contain-
ing no modalities (in other words, to construct a single path).
We omit details for space constraints, but the construction of
the canonical model in the proof of their representation the-
orem uses the ρ function to switch from a belief base to a
set of paths (see Proof Sketch in the Appendix of Icard et
al. [2010]). Therefore, the representation theorem does not
hold for all formulas of the logic, since it is not possible to
apply the function ρ to all beliefs.
Summarizing, we recognize two shortcoming of the IPS
framework as a formal basis for the database perspective: The
definition of contingent beliefs is problematic, and the repre-
sentation theorem does not hold for belief bases containing
modalities.
2.3 van Zee et al. (PAL)
van Zee et al. [2015b] develop Parameterized-time Action
Logic (PAL) as an alternative to IPS, claiming that the IPS
framework contains an unsound axiom and that their logic
is noncompact [van Zee et al., 2015a]. They define Act =
{a,b,c, . . .} as a finite set of deterministic primitive actions,
and Prop = {p,q,r, . . .}∪{pre(a), post(a) | a ∈ Act} as a fi-
nite set of propositions. They denote atomic propositions
with χ. PAL differs syntactically from IPS in that the -
modality is indexed by a time-point. Their language LPAL
is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= χt | do(a)t |tϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ
PAL uses a CTL*-like tree semantics consisting of a tree
T = (S,R,v,act) where S is a set of states, R is an accessi-
bility relation that is serial, linearly ordered in the past and
connected, v : S → 2Prop is a valuation function from states
to sets of propositions, and act : R → Act is a function from
accessibility relations to actions, such that actions are deter-
ministic, i.e. if act((s,s′)) = act((s,s′′)), then s′ = s′′. Sim-
ilarly to Icard et al., PAL uses an equivalence relation ∼t on
paths. Using this equivalence relations they define a model
as a pair (T,pi) on which the same conditions hold as an IPS
model. PAL formulas are evaluated in a model on a path.
van Zee et al. axiomatize PAL and show that it is sound and
strongly complete, i.e. T ⊢ ϕ iff T |= ϕ. They characterize
AGM belief revision in this logic and restrict time up to some
t. Using these constraints, they are able to represent a belief
set B as a propositional formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ⊢ ϕ}
and they prove the Katsuno and Mendelzon (KM) [1991] and
the Darwiche and Pearl (DP) [Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] rep-
resentation theorems.
van Zee et al. only consider revision of PAL formulas
and thus do not consider the problem of intention revision,
and therefore also does not distinguish between strong and
weak beliefs. However, PAL uses a standard branching time
(CTL*-like [Reynolds, 2002]) semantics, and it therefore also
does not suffer from the shortcomings that we addressed in
the previous subsection. Therefore, we take PAL as a starting
point and use the remainder of this paper to extend it so that
we can study intention revision.
3 The Belief-Intention Database
We assume an intention database I = {(a, t), . . .} consisting of
time-indexed actions. We next define a coherence condition
on beliefs and intentions in PAL, and we separate strong and
weak beliefs.
3.1 The Coherence Condition
We first demonstrate that Cohere∗(I) of IPS (Section 2.2) is
too permissive because it allows models in which intentions
are not jointly executable.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
s0
{pre(nmr)} s1
{post(nmr)} s2 {post(nop)}
s3
{pre(i jcai),
post(nop)}
s4 {post(i jcai)}
s5 {post(nop)}
nmr
nop
nop
ijcai
nop
Figure 1: Example Model from t = 0 to t = 2.
Example 3 (Running Example). An agent is considering to
attend the NMR workshop at time 0 and the IJCAI conference
at time 1. Although it would like to attend both events, there
is insufficient budget available. Consider a possible partial
semantic model of this situation depicted in Figure 1, where
the thick path represents the actual path. In the actual path,
the agent believes it does nothing at time 0 and attends IJCAI
at time 1. It also considers it possible to attend the NMR
workshop at time 0 and do nothing at time 1 in an alternative
path. However, it does not consider it to be possible to attend
both events.
Suppose the agent of the running example has two inten-
tions: I = {(nmr,0),(i jcai,1)}. Intuitively, the agent’s in-
tentions do not cohere with its beliefs, because it believes it
cannot execute them both due to insufficient budget. How-
ever, according to Cohere∗(I) the agent is coherent because
the preconditions of all intentions hold on some path (namely
the current path). Thus, Cohere∗(I) does not fulfill Shoham’s
coherence condition 1 (Section 2.1). More specifically, the
problem is that it is not possible to define the precondition
of a set of actions in terms of preconditions of individual ac-
tions, because it cannot be ensured that all the intentions are
fulfilled on the same path as well. Therefore, in order to for-
malize a coherence condition in PAL, we extend the language
with preconditions of finite action sequences, which ensures
that after executing the first action, the precondition for the
remaining actions are still true. We modify the language, the
definition of a model, the axiomatization, and we show that
the new axiomatization is sound and strongly complete. We
call the new logic PAL-P (Parameterized-time Action Logic
with extended Preconditions).
Definition 2 (PAL-P Language). The language L is ob-
tained from LPAL by adding {pre(a,b, . . .)t | {a,b, . . .} ⊆
Act, t ∈ N} to the set of propositions. Moreover, Past(t) con-
sists of boolean combinations of pt′ , pre(a,b, . . .)t′ ,t′ϕ and
do(a)t′−1 where t ′ ≤ t and ϕ is some formula from L .
We also extend the definition of a model accordingly.
Definition 3 (PAL-P Model). A model is a pair (T,pi) with
T = (S,R,v,act) such that for all pi ∈ T the following holds:
1. If act(pit) = a, then post(a) ∈ v(pit+1),
2. If pre(a) ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with pi∼t pi′
and act(pi′t) = a,
3. If pre(. . . ,a,b)t ∈ v(pit), then pre(. . . ,a)t ∈ v(pit),
4. If pre(a,b, . . .)t ∈ v(pit), then there is some pi′ in T with
pi∼t pi′, act(pi′t) = a, and pre(b, . . .)t+1 ∈ v(pi′t+1).
We refer to models of PAL-P with m1,m2, . . ., we refer to
sets of models with M1,M2, . . ., and we refer to the set of all
models with M.
Definition 4. The logic PAL-P consists of the all the axiom
schemas and rules of PAL [van Zee et al., 2015b] (Def. 7),
and the following two:
pre(. . . ,a,b)t → pre(. . . ,a)t (A11)
(pre(a,b, . . .)t ∧do(a)t)→ pre(b, . . .)t+1 (A12)
The relation ⊢ is defined in the usual way with the restriction
that necessitation can be applied to theorems only.
Theorem 1 (Completeness Theorem). The logic PAL-P is
sound and strongly complete, i.e. T ⊢ ϕ iff T |= ϕ.3
The proof of the theorem is a direct extension the proof of
van Zee et al. with the new axioms and the new conditions
on a model.
Note that it is not directly possible in PAL-P to express
preconditions for actions that do not occur directly after each
other. In order to do so, we simply make a disjunction over
all possible action combinations in the time points in be-
tween the actions. Thus, if for instance Act = {a,b} and I =
{(a,1),(b,3)}, then Cohere(I) = ♦0
∨
x∈Act pre(a,x,b)1 =
♦0(pre(a,a,b)1∨ pre(a,b,b)1).4
Definition 5 (Coherence). Given an intention database I =
{(bt1 , t1), . . . ,(btn , tn)} with t1 < .. . < tn, let
Cohere(I) = ♦0
∨
ak∈Act:k 6∈{t1,...,tn}
ak=bk:k∈{t1,...,tn}
pre(at1 ,at1+1, . . . ,atn)t1 .
3We provide the full proofs of all theorems and
propositions in this paper in a separate technical report:
http://www.dropbox.com/s/798g6ki0aqt3gds/ijcai2016proofs.pdf?dl=1
4Our construction of preconditions over action sequences may
lead to a coherence condition involving a big disjunction. This
is a drawback in terms of computational complexity. Alterna-
tively, one may explicitly denote the time of each precondition, e.g.
pre(a,b)(t1,t2). We chose the former since it is conceptually closer
to the original syntax, but the latter can be implemented straightfor-
wardly.
For a given set of models M, we say that (M, I) is coherent iff
there exists some m ∈M with m |=Cohere(I).
We now show that the new coherence conditions correctly
specifies that the agent of our running example is not coher-
ent.
Example 4 (Continued). The models of the agent of our run-
ning example are not coherent with the intention database
I = {(nmr,0),(i jcai,1)}, because the agent does not have the
possibility to jointly execute both intentions (i.e. the precon-
ditions for both actions together is false). Thus, none of the
models satisfy ♦0 pre(nmr, i jcai)0, even though they satisfy
♦0 pre(nmr)0∧♦0 pre(i jcai)1.
3.2 Strong and Weak Beliefs
The idea behind strong beliefs is that they represent the
agent’s ideas about what is inevitable, no matter how it would
act in the world. Weak beliefs, on the other hand, represent
the beliefs of an agent that are the consequence of its planned
actions [Van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003]. Formally, we
define strong beliefs at some time t as formulas that start ei-
ther with ♦t ort . The set of all strong beliefs Bt in time t for
LPAL is inductively defined by the following BNF grammar:
ϕ ::= tψ | ϕ∧ϕ | ¬ϕ,
where ψ ∈LPAL and t ∈N. A strong belief set in t is Bt ⊆Bt .
In the remainder of this paper, we assume t = 0 and we simply
write B and B to abbreviate B0 and B0.
The weak beliefs WB(B, I) are obtained from the strong
beliefs by adding beliefs that are contingent on the intentions
of the agent. In other words, the agent weakly believes every-
thing that it strongly believed and moreover that all intentions
will be realised, and everything that follows from this:
W B(B, I) =Cl(B∪{do(a)t | (a, t) ∈ I}).
Example 5 (Continued). Some example strong beliefs of
the agent of Figure 1 are ♦0do(nmr)0, ♦0do(i jcai)1, and
0♦1 post(nop)2. If the agent has the intention database
I = {(i jcai,1)}, then post(i jcai)2 is one of its weak beliefs.
4 Belief and Intention Revision
Postulates Following KM, we fix a way of representing a
belief set B consisting of strong beliefs by a propositional for-
mula ψ such that B= {ϕ |ψ⊢ϕ}. Since intentions and beliefs
that have been added by a planner are naturally bounded up to
some time point t, we define a bounded revision function and
we restrict the syntax and semantics of PAL-P up to a specific
time point. As a consequence, it is then possible to obtain the
single formula ψ for a set of strong beliefs B (Corollary 1).
We first define some notation that we use in the rest of this
paper.
Definition 6. An agent is a pair (ψ, I) consisting of a belief
formula ψ, and an intention base I. A denotes the set of all
agents, B denotes the set of all strong beliefs, I denotes the
set of all intentions, and D denotes the set of all intention
databases. We denote A,B,I, and D bounded up to t with
respectively A|t ,B|t ,I|t , and D|t . However, if the restriction is
clear from context, we may omit the superscript notation.
We now define a bounded revision function ∗t revising an
agent (ψ, I) with a tuple (ϕ, i) consisting of a strong belief
ϕ and an intention i, denoted (ψ, I) ∗t (ϕ, i), where t is the
maximal time point occurring in ψ, I,ϕ, and i.
Definition 7 (Agent Revision Function). An Agent revision
function ∗t : A× (B× I)→ A maps an agent, a strong belief
formula, and an intention— all bounded up to t— to an agent
bounded up to t such that if,
(ψ, I)∗t (ϕ, i) = (ψ′, I′),
(ψ2, I2)∗t (ϕ2, i2) = (ψ′2, I′2),
then following postulates hold:
(P1) ψ′ implies ϕ.
(P2) If ψ∧ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ′ ≡ ψ∧ϕ.
(P3) If ϕ is satisfiable, then ψ′ is also satisfiable.
(P4) If ψ≡ ψ2 and ϕ≡ ϕ2 then ψ′ ≡ ψ′2.
(P5) If ψ≡ ψ2 and ϕ2 ≡ ϕ∧ϕ′ then ψ′∧ϕ′ implies ψ′2.
(P6) If ψ≡ ψ2, ϕ2 ≡ ϕ∧ϕ′, and ψ′∧ϕ′ is satisfiable,
then ψ′2 implies ψ′∧ϕ′.
(P7) (ψ′, I′) is coherent.
(P8) If (ψ′,{i}) is coherent, then i ∈ I′.
(P9) If (ψ′, I∪{i}) is coherent, then I∪{i} ⊆ I′.
(P10) I′ ⊆ I∪{i}.
(P11) If I = I2, i = i2, and ψ′ ≡ ψ′2, then I′ = I′2.
(P12) For all I′′ with I′ ⊂ I′′⊆ I∪{i}:(ψ′, I′′) is not coherent.
Postulates (P1)-(P6) are simply the KM postulates in
our setting, which are equivalent to the AGM postu-
lates [Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991]. They also state that
the revision of strong beliefs does not depend on the inten-
tions. Postulates (P7)-(P10) also appear in IPS. Postulate (P7)
states that the outcome of a revision should be coherent. Pos-
tulate (P8) states that the new intention i take precedence over
all other current intentions; if possible, it should be added,
even if all current intentions have to be discarded. Postulate
(P9) and (P10) together state that if it is possible to simply
add the intention, then this is the only change that is made.
Postulate (P11) states that if we revise with the same i but
with a different belief, and we end up with the same belief
in both cases, then we also end up with the same intentions.
Finally, (P12) states that we do not discard intentions unnec-
essarily. This last postulate is comparable to the parsimony
requirement introduced by Grant et al. [2010].
Representation Theorem We next characterize all revision
schemes satisfying (P1)-(P12) in terms of minimal change
with respect to an ordering among interpretations and a selec-
tion function accommodating new intentions while restoring
coherence. We bound models of strong beliefs up to t, which
means that all the paths in the model are “cut off” at t. This
ensures finitely many non-equivalent formulas for some be-
lief set B. A t-bounded model m|t = (T |t ,pi|t) is a model con-
taining a tree T in which all paths, including pi, have length
t. Strong beliefs are about possibility and necessity, and they
are independent of a specific path. Therefore, if a single path
in a tree is a model of a strong belief, then all paths in this tree
are models of this strong belief. Formally, a set of models of
a strong belief MSB satisfies the following condition:
If (T,pi) ∈MSB, then (T,pi′) ∈MSB for all pi′ ∈ T.
A set of t-bounded models of a strong belief M|tSB contains
only t restricted models of a strong belief. We write M|tSB
to denote the set of all sets of t-bounded models of strong
beliefs. We now show that we can represent a set of models
of strong beliefs by a single formula.
Lemma 1. Let Ext(M|tSB) be the set of all possible extensions
of a set of bounded model of strong beliefs M|tSB to models, i.e.
Ext(M|tSB) = {m ∈M | m
|t ∈ M|tSB}. Given a set of t-bounded
models of strong beliefs M|tSB, there exists a strong belief for-
mula f orm(M|tSB) such that Mod( f orm(M|tSB)) = Ext(M|tSB).
Corollary 1. Given a t-bounded strong belief set B, there
exists a formula ψ such that B = {ϕ | ψ ⊢ ϕ}.
Proof Sketch. For a given belief set B, we can show that there
exists a set of t-bounded models of a strong belief M|tSB s.t.
Ext(M|tSB) = Mod(B). If ψ = f orm(M|tSB), then Mod(ψ) =
Mod(B), and by the completeness theorem, B =Cl(ψ).
Given an intention database I, we define a selection func-
tion γtI that tries to accommodate a new intention based on
strong beliefs. The selection function specifies preferences
on which intention an agent would like to keep in the pres-
ence of the new beliefs.
Definition 8 (Selection Function). Given an intention
database I, a selection function γtI : MSB × I → D maps a
set of models of a strong belief and an intention to an up-
dated intention database—all bounded up to t— such that if
γtI(M|t ,{i}) = I′, then:
1. (M|t , I′) is coherent.
2. If (M|t ,{i}) is coherent, then i ∈ I′.
3. If (M|t , I∪{i}) is coherent, then I∪{i} ⊆ I′.
4. I′ ⊆ I∪{i}.
5. For all I′′ with I′ ⊂ I′′ ⊆ I∪{i}:(M|t , I′′) is not coherent.
The five conditions on the selection function are in direct
correspondence with postulates (P7)-(P10), (P12) of the agent
revision function ∗t . Note that postulate (P11) doesn’t have a
corresponding condition in the definition above but is repre-
sented by the fact that the selection function takes the revised
beliefs as input. That is, intention revision occurs after belief
revision.
KM define a faithful assignment from a belief formula to a
pre-order over models. Since we are also considering inten-
tions, we extend this definition such that it also maps inten-
tions databases to selection functions.
Definition 9 (Faithful assignment). A faithful assignment is
a function that assigns to each strong belief formula ψ ∈ B|t
a total pre-order ≤tψ over M and to each intention database
I ∈D|t a selection function γtI and satisfies the following con-
ditions:
1. If m1,m2 ∈Mod(ψ), then m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1.
2. If m1 ∈Mod(ψ) and m2 6∈Mod(ψ), then m1 < m2.
3. If ψ≡ φ, then ≤tψ=≤tφ.
4. If T |t = T |t2 , then (T,pi) ≤tψ (T2,pi2) and (T2,pi2) ≤tψ
(T,pi).
Conditions 1 to 3 on the faithful assignment are the same
as those of KM. Condition 4 ensures that we do not distin-
guish between models in the total pre-order ≤tψ whose trees
are the same up to time t. This is essentially what is repre-
sented in the revision function by bounding the all input of
the revision function ∗t up to t. Moreover, ≤tψ does not dis-
tinguish between models obtained by selecting two different
paths from the same tree. This corresponds to the fact that we
are using strong belief formulas in the revision, which do not
distinguish between different paths in the same tree as well.
Theorem 2 (Representation Theorem). An agent revision op-
erator ∗t satisfies postulates (P1)-(P12) iff there exists a faith-
ful assignment that maps each ψ to a total pre-order ≤tψ and
each I to a selection function γtI such that if (ψ, I) ∗t (ϕ, i) =
(ψ′, I′), then:
1. Mod(ψ′) = min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ)
2. I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i)
Proof Sketch. We only sketch the proof of “ ⇒′′: Suppose
that some agent revision operator ∗t satisfies postulates (P1)-
(P12). Given models m1 and m2, let (ψ, /0) ∗t ( f orm(m|t1 )∨
f orm(m|t2 ),ε) = (ψ′, /0). We define ≤tψ by m1 ≤tψ m2 iff
m1 |= ψ or m1 |= ψ′. We also define γtI by γtI(M|t SB, i) = I′,
where ( f orm(M|t SB), I) ∗t (⊤, i) = (ψ2, I′) (note that ψ2 ≡
f orm(M|t SB)).
Let us prove condition 4 of Definition 9. For m1 = (T,pi)
and m2 = (T2,pi2), let ψ′ be as above. Since ψ,ψ′ ∈ B|t and
T |t = T |t2 , we have m1 |= ψ iff m2 |= ψ and m1 |= ψ′ iff m2 |=
ψ′, so m1 ≤tψ m2 and m2 ≤tψ m1.
Following KM, one can show that conditions 1 to 3
from Definition 9 hold, and furthermore that Mod(ψ′) =
min(Mod(ϕ),≤tψ). We now prove I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i).
By our definition of γtI we have that (ψ′, I) ∗t (⊤, i) =
(ψ2,γtI(Mod(ψ′), i)) (recall that ψ′ ≡ ψ2). Since (ψ, I) ∗t
(ϕ, i) = (ψ′, I′), by (P11) we obtain that I′ = γtI(Mod(ψ′), i).
Using postulate (P7)-(P10) and (P12) we can prove that γtI is
a selection function.
Finally, it turns out to be straightforward to formulate the
DP postulates for iterated revision in our framework for the
strong beliefs and to prove their representation theorem. Due
to space constraints we have omitted the results, but they can
be found in a separate technical report.5
5 Related Work
Grant et al. [2010] develop AGM-style postulates for be-
lief, intention, and goal revision. They provide a de-
tailed analysis and propose different reconsideration strate-
gies, but restrict themselves to a syntactic analysis. Much
5
http://www.dropbox.com/s/798g6ki0aqt3gds/ijcai2016proofs.pdf?dl=1
effort in combining AGM revision with action logics (e.g.,
the Event Calculus [Mueller, 2010], Temporal Action Log-
ics [Kvarnstro¨m, 2005], extensions to the Fluent Calcu-
lus [Thielscher, 2001], and extensions to the Situation Cal-
culus (see [Patkos, 2010, Ch.2] for an overview)) concen-
trates on extending these action theories to incorporate sens-
ing or knowledge-producing actions. Shapiro et al. [2011]
extend the Situation Calculus to reason about beliefs rather
than knowledge by introducing a modality B and shows that
both the AGM postulates and the DP postulates are satisfied
in this framework. A similar approach concerning the Fluent
Calculus has been formalized by Jin and Thielscher [2004],
and is further developed by Scherl [2005] and Scherl and
Levesque [2003] by taking into account the frame problem
as well. However, none of these approaches prove repre-
sentations theorems linking revision to a total pre-order on
models. Baral and Zhang [2005] model belief updates on
the basis of semantics of modal logic S5 and show that their
knowledge update operator satisfies all the KM postulates.
Bonanno [2007] combines temporal logic with AGM belief
revision by extending a temporal logic with a belief opera-
tor and an information operator. Both these approaches do
not take action or time into account and do not prove repre-
sentation theorems. The concept of strong beliefs has been
discussed extensively in the literature, for instance in the
story of Little Nell [McDermott, 1982] or a paradox found in
knowledge-based programs [Fagin et al., 1995] (see van der
Hoek et al. [2003] for a detailed discussion).
6 Conclusion
We develop a logical theory for reasoning about temporal be-
liefs and intentions based on Shoham’s database perspective.
We propose postulates for revision of strong beliefs and in-
tentions, and prove a representation theorem relating the pos-
tulates to our formal model. Icard et al. prove a comparable
representation theorem, but we show in this paper that it does
not hold in general. In their proof, they use a canonical model
construction, while we proof our representation theorem us-
ing standard techniques from belief revision. It remains an
open problem whether a canonical model construction is pos-
sible when proving the representation theorem of Icard et al.
For future work, we aim to extend our formalism with
goals, which seems a natural extension in order to allow the
agent to, for instance, replace intentions instead of merely
discarding them. This paves the road to develop a richer
notion of intentions, such as that “intentions normally pose
problems for the agents; the agent needs to determine a way
of achieving them” [Cohen and Levesque, 1990]. Interest-
ingly, adding goals to the formalism blurs the distinction be-
tween planner and databases. If the databases take over part
of the planning, then well-known problems such as the frame
problem become more stringent. Existing action logics (e.g.,
the Event Calculus or the Fluent Calculus) and database ap-
proaches (e.g., TMMS [Dean and McDermott, 1987]) have
dealt with these problems in detail, so comparing and pos-
sibly enriching them with our formalism seems both useful
and relevant future work.
7 Acknowledgments
We thank Leon van der Torre and Eric Pacuit for useful com-
ments. Marc van Zee and Dragan Doder are both funded
by the National Research Fund (FNR), Luxembourg, respec-
tively by the RationalArchitecture and the PRIMAT project.
References
[Alchourron et al., 1985] Carlos E. Alchourron, Peter
Ga¨rdenfors, and David Makinson. On the logic of theory
change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions.
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50(2):510–530, 06 1985.
[Baral and Zhang, 2005] Chitta Baral and Yan Zhang.
Knowledge updates: Semantics and complexity issues.
Artificial Intelligence, 164(1):209–243, 2005.
[Bonanno, 2007] Giacomo Bonanno. Axiomatic characteri-
zation of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal
logic. Artificial Intelligence, 171(2):144–160, 2007.
[Bratman, 1987] Michael E. Bratman. Intention, plans, and
practical reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1987.
[Cohen and Levesque, 1990] Philip R Cohen and Hector J
Levesque. Intention is choice with commitment. Artifi-
cial Intelligence, 42(2-3):213–261, 1990.
[Cohen and Levesque, 1991] Philip R. Cohen and Hector J.
Levesque. Teamwork. Nouˆs, 25(4):487–512, 1991.
[Darwiche and Pearl, 1997] Adnan Darwiche and Judea
Pearl. On the logic of iterated belief revision. Artificial
Intelligence, 89(12):1 – 29, 1997.
[Dean and McDermott, 1987] Thomas L Dean and Drew V
McDermott. Temporal data base management. Artificial
Intelligence, 32(1):1–55, 1987.
[Ditmarsch et al., 2011] Hans Ditmarsch, Tiago Lima, and
Emiliano Lorini. Intention Change via Local Assignments,
pages 136–151. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Hei-
delberg, 2011.
[Fagin et al., 1995] Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram
Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Reasoning about Knowledge.
MIT Press, 1995.
[Grant et al., 2010] John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Donald Perlis,
and Michael Wooldridge. Postulates for revising BDI
structures. Synthese, 175(1):39–62, 2010.
[Icard et al., 2010] Thomas Icard, Eric Pacuit, and Yoav
Shoham. Joint revision of belief and intention. Proc. of
the 12th International Conference on Knowledge Repre-
sentation, pages 572–574, 2010.
[Jin and Thielscher, 2004] Yi Jin and Michael Thielscher.
Representing beliefs in the fluent calculus. In ECAI, pages
823–827. IOS Press, 2004.
[Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991] Hirofumi Katsuno and Al-
berto O. Mendelzon. Propositional knowledge base
revision and minimal change. Artificial Intelligence,
52(3):263–294, dec 1991.
[Kvarnstro¨m, 2005] Jonas Kvarnstro¨m. TALplanner and
other extensions to Temporal Action Logic. PhD thesis,
Linko¨pings universitet, 2005.
[Lorini and Herzig, 2008] Emiliano Lorini and Andreas
Herzig. A logic of intention and attempt. Synthese,
163(1):45–77, 2008.
[Lorini et al., 2009] Emiliano Lorini, Mehdi Dastani,
Hans P. van Ditmarsch, Andreas Herzig, and John-
Jules Ch. Meyer. Intentions and assignments. In LORI,
volume 5834 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
198–211. Springer, 2009.
[McDermott, 1982] Drew McDermott. A temporal logic for
reasoning about processes and plans. Cognitive science,
6(2):101–155, 1982.
[Mueller, 2010] Erik T Mueller. Commonsense reasoning.
Morgan Kaufmann, 2010.
[Patkos, 2010] Theodore Patkos. A formal theory for reason-
ing about action, knowledge and time. PhD thesis, Univer-
sity of Crete-Heraklion, 2010.
[Reynolds, 2002] M. Reynolds. An axiomatization of full
computation tree logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic,
66(3):1011–1057, 2002.
[Scherl and Levesque, 2003] Richard B Scherl and Hector J
Levesque. Knowledge, action, and the frame problem. Ar-
tificial Intelligence, 144(1):1–39, 2003.
[Scherl, 2005] Richard B Scherl. Action, belief change and
the frame problem: A fluent calculus approach. In Pro-
ceedings of the Sixth workshop on Nonmonotonic Reason-
ing, Action, and Change at IJCAI, 2005.
[Shapiro et al., 2011] Steven Shapiro, Maurice Pagnucco,
Yves Lesprance, and Hector J. Levesque. Iterated belief
change in the situation calculus. Artificial Intelligence,
175(1):165–192, 2011.
[Shoham, 2009] Yoav Shoham. Logical theories of intention
and the database perspective. Journal of Philosophical
Logic, 38(6):633–647, 2009.
[Shoham, 2016] Yoav Shoham. Why knowledge representa-
tion matters. Commun. ACM, 59(1):47–49, January 2016.
[Thielscher, 2001] Michael Thielscher. The concurrent, con-
tinuous fluent calculus. Studia Logica, 67(3):315–331,
2001.
[Van der Hoek and Wooldridge, 2003] Wiebe Van der Hoek
and Michael Wooldridge. Towards a logic of rational
agency. Logic Journal of IGPL, 11(2):135–159, 2003.
[van der Hoek et al., 2007] Wiebe van der Hoek, Wojciech
Jamroga, and Michael Wooldridge. Towards a theory of
intention revision. Synthese, 155(2):265–290, 2007.
[van Zee et al., 2015a] Marc van Zee, Mehdi Dastani, Dra-
gan Doder, and Leendert van der Torre. Consistency Con-
ditions for Beliefs and Intentions. In Twelfth International
Symposium on Logical Formalizations of Commonsense
Reasoning, 2015.
[van Zee et al., 2015b] Marc van Zee, Dragan Doder, Mehdi
Dastani, and Leendert van der Torre. AGM Revision of
Beliefs about Action and Time. In Proceedings of the
International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence,
2015.
